Written by Curtis M. Goodman – November 2008

This briefing paper will cover the historic development of Bolivia’s political economy. It will provide historic context by examining the relevant domestic developments and international influences of major periods throughout Bolivia’s growth: 1825 – 1950; 1951 – 1995; 1995 – present.

The paper will examine Bolivia’s current position within World Trade Organization negotiations in relation to agriculture, development, and services. Through this examination, readers will gain a comprehensive understanding of the major strengths, weaknesses, opportunities, and threats facing Bolivia’s insertion in the global political economy and how the country performs as a global actor in trade.

This paper draws from a wide-variety of sources. The primary source of information has been the World Trade Organization (WTO) and trade review documents they have produced. The objective nature and accessible information within these documents provide rich context for Bolivia’s current position in the global economy. The information drawn from the WTO is substantiated by numerous academic articles written as far back as the 1950s.

The Overseas Development Institute’s paper, Bolivia’s Participation in International Trade Negotiations, proved invaluable to the discussion of the nation’s current position on WTO negotiations. Furthermore, a number of observations within this paper are based upon the author’s personal experience during a business-visit to Bolivia in 2000. This first-hand experience within the country provided rich insight into Bolivian processes and discussions with Bolivian citizens provided great understanding of the development issues at hand.

This paper is a reflection of my own fascination with Bolivia. Having travelled throughout the country in 2006 I had the opportunity to meet with numerous Bolivians and discuss the state of affairs. In particular my travels were of a business-nature with a primary focus on developing a new mining project near La Paz, Bolivia. I believe my experiences add a greater context to the discussion of Bolivia and contributed to the length of this briefing paper.

Background Information

Bolivia is characterized by a diverse landscape, stretching from the rugged Andes to the Amazonian basin and rainforest. The landlocked nation has faced overwhelming challenges to its development. The country is home to the highest percentage of indigenous citizens with the lowest per capita income in all the Americas. The Spanish conquests of 1525 introduced three centuries of exploitation of both the country’s natural resources and the indigenous population.

Officially Bolivia declared independence in 1825 but the colonial legacy remained well into the twentieth century. Since independence Bolivia has incurred a staggering 192 changes in government by coup d’etat, a world record. These coups predictably limited the capabilities of state institutions including the judiciary, law enforcement, and the Ministry of Agriculture and Peasant Affairs. (Healy, 1988)

The Bolivian economy is distinguished by a unique dependence on agriculture and mining. Agriculture accounts for more than 14% of total Gross Domestic Product (GDP), with soybeans and coca as the predominant cash crops. There is also steady production of cotton, sugarcane, wheat, and tropical lumber. Most industry is small-scale, serving regional markets. Leading manufacturers are engaged in production of clothing and refined metals. Mining has always played a pivotal role in Bolivia’s development.

Throughout history Bolivia has proven to be a valuable source of mineral wealth, leading the world in tin exports. Bolivia is the world’s largest producer of tin and has proven deposits of copper, lead, silver, zinc, antimony, wolfram and gold. In 2004 a major project was announced for south-eastern Bolivia – where an estimated 40 billion tons of iron ore are to be extracted. (Forero, 2006) Many Latin American countries rely heavily on mineral exports; in Bolivia alone, mineral exports accounted for 46% of total export income in 2005 and 11.1% of total GDP. This is substantial, and is expected to grow at an average rate of 1.7% per year thru 2020. (GMID – Global Market Information Database, 2006)

Bolivia is a relatively small player in the global political economy. According to the World Trade Organization (WTO) Bolivia’s merchandise exports have averaged 2.13% of total world trade. In 2007 the GDP reached $13.19 billion – the highest level in history. It is estimated that Bolivia’s GDP is increasing by almost five percent annually. This is a welcome improvement after decades of staggered growth and economic hardship, most notably during the 1950s, 80s and 90s. Economic conditions have been largely tied to commodity prices. The main exports are: natural gas, soybeans and soy products, crude petroleum, zinc ore, and tin. Bolivia entered the WTO in 1995 in the hopes of enhancing their position within the global trading system. Since committing, they have complied wholeheartedly with the conditions set forth by the multilateral agreement. Bolivia has also become involved in such regional agreements as MERCOSUR and Cairns, and larger Doha coalitions such as the G20 and G33. These agreements will be detailed further in the section titled current negotiating positions.

The Bolivian cultural consists of: 30% Quechua, 25% Aymara, 30% Mestizo, and 15% ‘white’. Spanish is one of three official languages, along with Quechua and Aymara. While Spanish is the most widely-used, only 60-70% of the population speaks it, while most speak it as a second language.

The education system in Bolivia is improving, with estimations that 86.7% of the population are literate. This is considered to be quite high considering that of the 9.2 million inhabitants, sixty percent live below the poverty line. (CIA – World Factbook — Bolivia, 2008)

Transportation has always been an issue facing Bolivia. The rugged Andean mountains contrast the Amazonian low-lands presenting problems to reliable transportation routes. Bolivia engaged in The War of the Pacific, beginning in 1879 with neighboring countries Chile and Peru. The eventual defeat resulted in a major loss of territory which severely restricted access to major ports. <!–[if supportFields]> CITATION Lof70 \l 1033 <![endif]–> (Lofstrom, 1970)<!–[if supportFields]><![endif]–> This would later prove a major hindrance to development as it restricted the flow of goods to market. Railroads are built throughout the country, but much of the infrastructure was developed to the advantage of the mining industry, and does not accurately reflect either the manufacturing sector’s needs or movement routes of the general population. The weak transportation infrastructure equates to higher transport and insurance costs. (Trade Policy Review Body, 2005) This is amplified further as Bolivia is land-locked and depends on neighboring countries for the transit and transport of its goods to international markets.

It is essential to understand the condition of the Bolivian population – most of which live in extreme poverty. In all statistical respects, including GDP, GNP and GINI Index, Bolivia ranks last among their South American neighbors. Because of this most Bolivians do not fully participate in the global economy and are relatively unaware of the potentials that exist. A large percentage of the population is dependent on subsistence-based agriculture and maintains their traditional values and beliefs, with strong dedication to family and ‘Pacha Mama’ (Mother Earth). (Barbara J Frazier, 2004)

In a recent trade policy review by the WTO a number of high-growth potential areas were identified. These included: forestry, agriculture, livestock breeding and fisheries, timber, food and agro-industry, clothing, leather, and high quality jewelry. (Trade Policy Review Body, 2005)

The two main issues facing Bolivia are market access and the inability to compete with developed markets. Non-tariff barriers, subsidies and high tariffs have stood in the way of expanding the capabilities of domestic producers. Bolivia has relied on increasing their regional ties and negotiating capacities within multilateral institutions as a key to bettering their trade portfolio.

To understand the current realities Bolivia faces in the international marketplace it is essential to examine the historical development of their political economy.

Historical Development

1825 – 1950

After years of Spanish colonial rule Bolivia finally came to independence by the Liberating Army under command of General Antonio Jose de Sucre. At the time the battle was over the liberation of Upper Peru and was influenced by Simon Bolivar, an active proponent of South American independence. In 1824 Bolivar was named leader of Peru, which had declared independence from Spain only a few years earlier.

On August 6, 1825 Bolivia declared independence by winning an embittered battle between the Spanish Royal Army and the Liberating Army. General Sucre came to power over Bolivia and faced the daunting task of establishing a new government within a broken and overexploited colony. (Lofstrom, 1970) The colonial legacy supported two main tenets of the Bolivian economy that remained unchanged after independence, the traditional agriculture sector and the modern export-orientated mining sector. (Gomez, 1976)

According to William Lofstrom, two conditions existed which emphasized the new realities at hand. The first was “the economic and social institutions and attitudes inherited from three centuries of Spanish control.” Inheriting the Spanish system also meant inheriting the problems of class-disparity. Large mines and farm-lands, the driving force of the Bolivian economy, were controlled by the elite upper-class. The rich were able to avoid taxation under the colonial system while transferring most of their accumulated wealth to Spain. Effectively this resulted in modest re-investment into the economy and contributed very little to the development of the nation. The second element Lofstrom detailed was the resulting conditions of sixteen years of war. The indigenous population was understandably resentful of government intrusion and distrustful of corruption. Bolivia was in serious need of capital infusion to fix ailing government institutions and revive the economy as a whole. (Lofstrom, 1970)

In his article Institutional Barriers to Economic Development, Frank Keller describes the major hindrances of early Bolivian economy. Most notably is the system of land tenure, where a privileged few are entitled to the most fertile land available. Land ownership was largely decided under the Spanish colonial system and was characteristic of inequality between the native population and the white rulers. (Keller, 1955) Since the majority of Bolivia’s population was part of the oppressed indigenous population they had relatively little control over their own economic destiny. This systematic oppression of the indigenous population did not support development of a competitive economy. Both the agriculture and mining sector required massive amounts of labour-input. Cultural misunderstandings led to clear distinction between the ruling upper class and the oppressed indigenous population. The imbalance of power led to an environment rife with distrust for authority – which continues on today. (Lofstrom, 1970)

General Sucre sought to change the system by eliminating colonial tax structures which were considered inequitable. Tax reform was needed to cover the burden of a new government system and the associated institutions like schools and hospitals. (Ness, 1938) With an economy largely based on export of natural resources, namely silver and tin, Bolivia was therefore susceptible to commodity price fluctuations of these primary exports.

In an effort to raise foreign direct investment, Sucre ordered “all caved-in, flooded, or abandoned mines to revert to the state and be rented or sold at public auction for the payment of national debts.” (Lofstrom, 1970) However, revolutionary political conditions during the 19^th century were not encouraging to large investments of this nature. This longing for independence echoed throughout South America; Venezuela, Ecuador, and other areas were all struggling to separate from Spanish rule as well. However, Bolivia’s isolation from major shipping ports and a weak transportation infrastructure intensified their isolation from foreign capital. (Ness, 1938)

Rising commodity prices through the beginnings of the twentieth century improved Bolivia’s economic position in the global economy. Bolivia’s mineral wealth had already been proven by numerous geological expeditions but lacked the appropriate conditions to spark direct investment in the mining industry. During the colonial period silver was the primary export. During the early 1900s tin became the primary export due to the international demand leading up to the First World War. (Juan Antonio, 1989) The early 20^th century offered new opportunities and better returns for foreign investors – who came in droves to Bolivia.

The increased availablility of internal capital initiated new government projects including new railways and increased military spending. The new railway projects were developed to the benefit of increasing transportation efficiencies for the mining sector. Military spending continued to increase from 1915 through 1930 reaching 40% of the total budget. (Contreras, 1990) Funds for government projects came from internal loans up until 1908. As available credit dried up the government began seeking international loans. Between 1908 and 1930 the Bolivian government borrowed almost US$80 million to fund the deficit spending.(Ness, 1938)

The amassing of such debt to finance government expenditures in such as short period would

prove to haunt the country’s independence for decades to come.

During this time the government was reluctant to tax the export of minerals considered to be a valuable source of internal revenue. Large mining companies feared increased taxes to cover the deficit and actively opposed the proposed mining tax of 11%. The lobbying interests of the companies were able to stall the implementation until 1923, nearly twelve years after the proposal – long after the first major commodity boom. (Contreras, 1990) The Bolivian debt became more than that which could realistically be recovered through taxes.

Not surprisingly Bolivia entered into a severe recession with the rest of the World through the 1930s. Three main issues confronting Bolivia during this time were: impact of falling commodity prices, territorial conflict, and controversial mining taxes.

As the world entered the Great Depression there was a marked decrease in the demand of primary raw materials. Bolivia’s dependence on collecting taxes from tin exports left their economy particularly vulnerable to price fluctuations. Dropping demand for tin hit the Bolivian export-economy hard. In 1931 Bolivia defaulted on loan payments when Britain abandoned the gold standard. (Contreras, 1990) This sparked immediate concern with investors and creditors due to the inherent risks of economic uncertainty.

The political climate within Bolivia was concentrated on territorial conflicts, which added further instability. The Chaco War with Paruguay served as a demoralizing and devastating loss of territory for Bolivia. The three-year conflict beginning in 1932 over oil-rich lowlands effectively divided the country. The disputed area included the headwaters of the Paraguay River – which extends over 2500kms to the Atlantic Ocean. Had Bolivia been able to exert control of the area it would have effectively provided a stable transportation route to major ports located in Montevideo, Uruguay.

Short years later, foreign interests pressured the still-young Bolivian government to adopt a stricter mining taxation regime to cover the incurred debts of this time. Between 1937 and 1951 the average tax on mining exports was 16.6%. (Gomez, 1976) Higher taxes combined with increasing capital requirements to replace aging equipment. Most of Bolivia’s mining operations had equipment “installed during the production expansion of the 1920s, and had not been replaced or modernized for twenty years.” Due to the taxes and capital requirements investors were not drawn to projects in Bolivia. (Desarrollo Economico de Bolivia, 1958) The overall impact on the mining sector was widespread, eliminating once profitable margins for most operations.

1951 – 1995

The second period of Bolivia’s historic development is characterized by periods of economic uncertainty and social unrest. The 1950s can be summarized in two words: utter chaos. This era began with the violent coup d’etat led by the Movimiento Nacionalista Revolucionario (MNR) in 1952. The MNR represented the once-silent opposition to the corrupt past-governments.

MNR gained social momentum claiming to work in the interests of the people yet the impacts of their leadership were widespread and generally negative. The violent revolution, combined with a depressed economy, pushed Bolivia closer towards a serious predicament. During the early years of 1950 there were five characteristics which amounted to an atmosphere of serious crisis:

1. Runaway inflation

2. Increased power and politicization of labour unions

3. Scarcity and rationing of basic consumption goods

4. Widespread corruption of MNR party members

5. Fear of reforms leading to nationalization of private agriculture and mine lands[1]

One of the principle platforms of MNR’s campaign was the revitalization of the mining sector. The plan was to even the playing field in Bolivia – effectively empowering the native population by taking control of mining and agriculture. MNR advocated nationalizing all mines, taking control of all firms operating within the country under a new government mining corporation called COMIBOL.

According to Rhys Jenkins this abolished the “traditional oligarchy… which formed the backbone of the Bolivian economy and land reform which abolished feudal relations and expropriated the large land owners.” He further purports this reasserted government control over the export economy, allowing surpluses to be used to pay past government deficits. However, this did very little for expanding the trade portfolio of the nation which was still dependent on primary commodity exports. (Jenkins, 1997) Hyper-inflation raised the cost of living forcing the population deeper into poverty, and the foreign debt pressured the government to seek international assistance. (Kofas, 1995)

During the 1956 elections Hernan Siles Zuazo formed the government under leadership of the MNR party. Upon formation, Zuazo faced a fragmented party and a unstable economy. (Zondag, 1966) Much of the accumulated foreign debt was owed to the United States, who were in the midst of forming international institutions for monetary control. In Jon Kofas’ article, Politics of Austerity, the International Monetary Fund (IMF) was called upon to implement the Inflation Stabilization Plan of 1957. Kofas indicates that the universal formula used by the IMF, namely: “decrease public spending, devalue the currency, tighten credit, and liberalize trade” did not necessarily benefit the Bolivian people. It is generally accepted that the IMF asserted the Bretton-Woods economic policy of the United States which “accorded preferential treatment to industrialized surplus countries at the expense of the underdeveloped deficit ones.” (Kofas, 1995) Essentially by allowing the IMF to stabilize the economy, Bolivia ceded much of it’s autonomy and sovereignty to the interests of the international community.

In the 1960s under the leadership of Victor Paz Estenssoro Bolivia attempted the much anticipated agricultural reforms. The MNR had long promoted the elimination of the fuedal-style land tenure that existed throughout Bolivia, yet had delivered very little on their promises. Agriculture reforms were “not designed to make Bolivia more self-sufficient, but to transform subsistence agriculture to commercial agriculture and integrate it with the international economy.” (Kofas, 1995) The agricultural sector had been battered as importing foodstuffs was often less expensive than transporting food from the interior. (Gomez, 1976) As Bolivia liberalized aspects of agriculture trade it marked the beginning of an increased dependence on agriculture to Bolivia’s trade portfolio.

Through the 1970s Bolivia was able to secure a stable domestic economy which encouraged international aid. According to Ronald Tinnermeier US$146 million of international relief funding became available between 1967and 1978. The increased credit availability allowed the government to allocate funds toward development of key agriculture areas like cotton and soy production. Between 1971 and 1978 almost one thousand loans, averaging $63,000 each for cotton and $36,000 for soy were distributed , predominantly to the Santa Cruz commerical farming elite. (Tinnermeier, 1981) Instability of prices on the international agriculture markets left Bolivia susceptible to fluctuations of the two main crop prices.

The Bolivian producers sold their crops forward on world markets, but then tried to renegotiate when the spot market prices rose above the forward contract price. They failed in the renegotiations… much of the cotton remained undelivered. The growers quietly defaulted on … loans and the government absorbed the losses with no attempt to collect. To this day, the bad cotton loans have undermined the solvency of the Agriculture Bank. (Juan Antonio, 1989)

Tinnermeier purports that by 1978 $30.1 million in loans were deliquent, blamed on factors including bad weather, insects, poor marketing and client selection. The high rate of deliquency deteriorated remaining agriculture funding and did little to improve the GDP and diversify Bolivia’s trade portfolio.

At this time, the illicit drug trade became a primary issue for Bolivia as they were the third largest producer and exporter of the world’s cocaine. (Healy, 1988) The cultural significance of the coca plant in Bolivia is paramount, as it is used daily by a majority of the population. The American-led ‘War On Drugs’ pressured the Bolivian government to eliminate production of the coca plant which had become a valuable cash crop for many peasants. Coca was used by yhe United States as leverage to exert their dominance and hegemonic influence.

By the 1980s Bolivia’s reputation was becoming well known on the world stage. The period between 1980 and 1985 was characterized by a drop in GDP of more than 10%, tripling unemployment and hyperinflation. (Jenkins, 1997) This all-too-familiar scenario prompted a dramatic increase in public deficit spending and sparked calls of widespread corruption, accompanied by “increased social mobilization reflected in strikes and demonstrations.” (Dunkerley, 1990) The re-election of Paz Estenssoro in 1985 prompted the development of the New Economic Policy (NEP)designed to provide structural adjustment to stabilize the economy. (Jenkins, 1997)

The main theme of the NEP was of trade liberalization which provided a new direction for policy makers within Bolivia. Three pillars of the NEP were: shift towards outward-orientated economy; liberalization of domestic markets; reduction of state role. (Aguirre A, 1992) According to Rhys Jenkins the government immediately entered into a contractionary fiscal and monetary policy – effectively eliminating 10% of government employees, freezing public sector wages and ceasing public investment. All of the tariffs applied on imports to Bolivia were systematically reduced from 20% in 1986 to 10% by 1990. The new tariff structure was by far much simpler than previous policies and drastically reduced the nominal rate of protection from 50% before 1985 to 14% in 1988. (Jenkins, 1997)

Although the NEP promoted trade liberalization it did not necessarily nurture Bolivia’s weak export sector. From 1990 to 1993 the Regimen de Importacion Temporal para la Exportacion allowed exporters to import required machinery with the guarantee that no import tariffs were to be applied, yet only thirty firms took advantage of the program. (Jenkins, 1997) Bolivia’s economy remained primarily based on primary commodities with little to no value-added products. (Aguirre A, 1992) Another problem of Bolivian exports was the lack of diversification on export destinations as most trade of this nature was with neighboring Latin American countries. (Jenkins, 1997)

1995 – Present

The third period of Bolivia’s political-economic development is characterized by participation in the increasing number of international trade institutions. In September of 1990 Bolivia officially joined the General Agreements on Tariffs and Trade (GATT) during the Uruguay Round of negotiations. At the time Bolivia’s trade policy was very much in line with GATT expectations, and so required no real structural change. Bolivia’s participation in GATT was further realized during the formation of the World Trade Organization (WTO) in 1995. From the start, main issues surrounding Bolivia’s involvement in the negotiation process were: agriculture, services, and intellectual property. (Bojanic, 2001) In 1997 the Ministry of Foreign Trade and Investment was created to facilitate building export competencies and trade policy formation.

It has been argued that due to the relatively small size of Bolivia’s economy such multi-lateral affiliations have impacted trade very little.(Frazier, 2004) Due to hardships in fully implementing the desired trade objectives, Bolivia has increased their participation in bi-lateral institutions and regional agreements. Most notably these include: Free Trade Area of the Americas (FTAA); Southern Common Market (MERCOSUR); Cairns Group; Latin American Integration Association (LAIA); Economic Complementarity Agreements (ECA) with Chile, Cuba, and Mexico; and Andean Trade Promotion and Drug Eradication Act (ATPDEA). “In all these agreements Bolivia promotes the liberalization of trade and seeks to increase market opportunities for its products.” (Bojanic, 2001)

According to the National Institute of Statistics, the main markets for Bolivia’s exports circa 2001 were: the European Union (27%), NAFTA (20%), the Andean Community of Nations – CAN (21%), MERCOSUR (18%), the rest of the world 14%. (INE 2001) Regional trade accounts for almost one-half of total exports yet there is ample opportunity to increase trade with developed nations. Through trade preference agreements Bolivia is able to enjoy low tariffs and no quota restrictions for most exports to the EU and USA, established in part as drug eradication strategies. (Barbara J Frazier, 2004) Overall, Bolivia avoids the use of non-tariff barriers and it has never taken anti-dumping or safeguard actions.<!–[if supportFields]> CITATION DrJ05 \l 1033 <![endif]–> (Asin, 2005)<!–[if supportFields]><![endif]–>

The election of Evo Morales in 2005 prompted substantial criticism of Bolivia on the world stage. Morales is the first indigenous leader of Bolivia, who came to power as the leader of the country’s recognized coca growers association. He was known as the ‘Cocalero’. Under his leadership the country has been overcome with constitution reform –finally releasing a first draft of a new constitution in mid-2008[2]. (Oxford, 2008) This has effectively divided the country between the ‘highlands’ represented by La Paz and the Altiplano, and the ‘lowlands’ represented by the resource-rich Santa Cruz area. The result has been social unrest characterized by massive protests, sparking a Santa-Cruz autonomy movement. In September of 2008 right-wing government opponents were responsible for violent and widespread civil disorder, resulting in roadblocks and the sabotaging of oil and gas installations. (Oxford, 2008) The Morales administration alleged that these opposition parties were effectively backed by USA forces and as a result, expelled the American ambassador from the country. Bolivia’s own ambassador in the United States withdrew in protest of the same suspicions. Venezuala followed suit shortly thereafter, expelling the US ambassador from their country as well.

At this point it is unclear how this will impact trade relations with the United States or the rest of the world.

Morales’ government has introduced reform to the hydrocarbon sector, further escalating tensions as it dramatically impacts the viability of foreign investment. Examining the exports from Bolivia in the new millenium it is apparent that the increase in petroleum and gas prices have strengthened the overall value of total exports. “Hydrocarbon exports increased from US$75 million in 1999 to US$847 million in 2004 – more than tenfold in value.” (Trade Policy Review: Bolivia, 2005)

Since his January 2006 inauguration, Morales has “nationalized” the hydrocarbons industry (forcing companies to negotiate new contracts and offering the state-owned oil company majority share of five firms) and threatened the mining and forestry sectors with similar action… Resulting political and economic uncertainty has presented challenges for potential investors. (Secretary for Economic, Energy and Agricultural Affairs)

With an increase in export value the new taxation laws have allowed the government to grow the tax base with the ultimate goal of providing support for strategic sectors such as hydrocarbons, mining, and electricity. (The Americas: Morales the Bountiful; Bolivia, 2006)

***Interested in more information on Bolivia’s current position in WTO negotiations? Stay tuned for another post that will address agriculture, development, and services.

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